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Abstract
Is financial globalization associated with improved international consump-
tion risk sharing? We focus on the long-term (i.e. low frequency) comove-
ment of consumption and output in answering this question. Theoretically,
the impact of financial globalization should show up first and most ro-
bustly in the lower frequencies of the data. We show that this is the case
empirically: by the end of our sample period (1960-2007) up to 40 percent
of long-term idiosyncratic consumption risk get shared between industri-
alized countries – as compared to less than 10 percent before 1990. This
dramatic increase is associated with a huge increase in international capi-
tal income flows: while capital income flows remain relatively limited as
a channel of risk sharing at business cycle horizons, their contribution to
international risk sharing at longer horizons has increased substantially.
Much of this increase can be attributed to the growth in international asset
positions over the recent globalization period.
Keywords: Consumption Risk Sharing, Financial Globalization, International
and regional business cycles, Capital flows, Home Bias, Non-stationary panel data
JEL classification: E21, F36, F4
1 Introduction
Financial market integration should lead to better international consump-
tion risk sharing. In this paper, we suggest to focus on the long-term co-
movement of consumption and output in identifying this effect. We first
show that long-term consumption risk sharing among OECD countries has
indeed increased considerably during the recent globalization period, i.e.
in particular after 1990. Towards the end of our sample period, which
ranges from 1960 to 2004 between 30 and 40 percent of long-term idiosyn-
cratic consumption risk get shared at an international level. Secondly, the
paper identifies a considerable increase in long-term international capital
income flows as the main channel through which these improvements in
international risk sharing have come about. Third, we empirically tie the
rising importance of capital income flows for consumption insurance to the
dramatic increase in international cross-holdings of financial assets that has
been documented in the recent literature.
There are number of reasons why we think it is important to exam-
ine the link between globalization, risk sharing and international capital
income flows with a focus on the long-term trend ( i.e. low frequency) in-
teractions of the data.
The first reason concerns the magnitude of the potential welfare bene-
fits from financial globalization. As is well known since Lucas (1987), elim-
inating purely transitory variation in consumption will carry only negligi-
ble welfare benefits. If, however, idiosyncratic shocks are very persistent,
the benefits from better consumption insurance may be huge.1 It remains
an open question to what extent international risk sharing has actually in-
1See e.g. the calculations in Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2000) and the literature
surveyed there
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creased at lower frequencies. We address this question in this paper.
Secondly, while a number of earlier studies have documented that the
growth in international asset positions is associated with improved risk
sharing at the business cycle frequency,2 most studies that have not explic-
itly conditioned on international asset holdings have not been able to detect
improvements in consumption risk sharing.3 Thus, while higher interna-
tional asset holdings seems to be associated with better risk sharing ceteris
paribus, it seems hard to conclude from the literature that consumption risk
sharing has actually increased unconditionally over the globalization pe-
riod. As we argue, focusing on the low frequency makes it easier to de-
tect an increase in risk sharing even without explicitly having to condition
on international asset holdings. One reason why conventional measures
of risk sharing – cross-country correlations between (mostly annual) con-
sumption growth rates or the volatility of consumption growth conditional
on output growth — may fail to pick up the effects of financial globaliza-
tion is that the onset of financial globalization in the 1980s has coincided
with a period of major changes in the comovement and volatility of in-
ternational business cycles. Even if financial markets are incomplete and
risk sharing is imperfect, one should expect consumption mainly to react
to permanent shocks in income. Therefore, as we have argued in a com-
panion paper (Artis and Hoffmann (2008b)), if the relative contribution of
trend and cyclical shocks to business cycles changes, this may affect ex-
tant consumption-based measures of risk sharing, blurring the effect that
financial is having on these measures at the same time. For example, if the
relative importance of permanent shocks to output increases (e.g. because
2See Sørensen et al. (2007) and Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2009) as well as the literature
surveyed there.
3See Heathcote and Perri (2004) or Bai and Zhang (2005)
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cycles become less volatile, as has been the case during the Great Modera-
tion of the last two decades), and consumption reacts primarily to perma-
nent shocks, this will increase the volatility of consumption conditional on
output – thus offsetting the effect of financial globalization which would
tend to lower this conditional volatility. Our approach here is to ask from
the outset how consumption reacts to low frequency shocks in output. Un-
like measures at the business-cycle frequency, our low-frequency measure
of risk sharing signals a steady increase in international risk sharing over
the globalization period even if we do not condition on international asset
positions.
We believe that it is very useful to have at hand a measure that signals
this increase in risk sharing over the globalization period unconditionally.
Financial globalization is a complex, multi-faceted, phenomenon that—
most likely—cannot simply be captured in the increase in international as-
set positions and other conditioning factors as they have been studied in the
recent literature. Many (hard to observe) institutional and cultural factors
could matter and some of them could actually work to offset the positive
impact that we would believe globalization to have on risk sharing. The
unconditional measure is meant to capture the joint impact of all of these
factors on risk sharing. This, again, makes it useful in assessing the welfare
benefits from financial globalization. 4
Third, we would expect the focus on the longer term to allow us to sep-
arate the effect on the various risk sharing channels more sharply. At busi-
4We emphasize that this does not rule out the possibility that risk sharing might increase
mainly due to the growth in international asset positions. In fact, we follow Sørensen et al.
(2007) in arguing that improved risk sharing and the decline in international home bias are
two sides of the same medal. Still it is important to construct a measure that allows us
to detect an increase in risk sharing without a priori having to condition on the growth in
international asset position: in this way it becomes possible to ask how much of the increase
in that measure can be accounted for by the increase in international asset holdings. To our
knowledge, this perspective is new to the literature.
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ness cycle frequencies and as long as macroeconomic fluctuations are tran-
sitory it will not make a big difference for consumption allocations whether
countries smooth their consumption through savings and dis-savings or
through capital income flows derived e.g. from equity (Baxter and Crucini
(1995)). However, if shocks are sufficiently persistent or even permanent,
intertemporal consumption smoothing through borrowing and lending will
not be possible. Risk sharing will therefore more likely take the form of
state contingent international income flows.5 This, again, indicates that we
should expect to see the impact of declining home bias on capital income
flows most strongly in the lower frequency of the data.6
Fourth, a recent influential literature in asset pricing starting with Bansal
and Yaron (2004) teaches us that long-term consumption risks are key drivers
of expected returns in financial markets. Long-term consumption growth
rates seem to be much more highly correlated with asset returns than are
short-term fluctuations (see e.g. Parker and Julliard (2005)). These facts
suggests that the risks that are priced in financial markets are predomi-
nantly long-term risks which lends further support to the notion that we
should expect improvements in consumption risk sharing to manifest them-
selves most strongly at longer horizons.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: we first place the
5Which, in turn, will require state-contingent assets, e.g. equity rather than bonds. Ei-
jffinger and Wagner (2010) provide an elegant model of how moral hazard may make per-
manent shocks hard to insure because it may be hard to enforce state-contingent contracts
at an international level.
6Another reason for focusing on the longer term in identifying the impact of declin-
ing home bias on international capital income flows could be valuation effects (Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2003), Gourinchas and Rey (2007)) i.e. the role that asset prices, and in par-
ticular exchange rate changes, play in the dynamics of foreign asset positions and for the
valuation of international income flows. While valuation effects could blur the effect of
declining home bias on risk sharing and on capital income flows (either by providing an
additional channel of insurance or by acting as a source of shocks), the evidence provided
by Gourinchas and Rey suggests that they matter for external adjustment mainly in the
short-run.
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paper in the context of the literature in the next subsection. Section 2 then
presents our empirical framework and the data along with our first im-
portant result: consumption risk sharing among industrialized has unam-
biguously increased once we focus on the lower frequencies of the data.
In section 3 we relate this result to the patterns of risk sharing, showing
that most of this increase is driven by an increase in capital income flows.
Finally we relate the increase in consumption risk sharing to the growth
in international gross asset positions. Section four summarizes and con-
cludes.
Placement in the literature
Recent contributions to which our paper is directly related are Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Sørensen et al. (2007), Becker and Hoffmann (2006),
Leibrecht and Scharler (2008) and Imbs and Fratzscher (2009). Whereas
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti document the virtual explosion in international as-
set cross-holdings during the 1990s, Sørensen et al. (2007) show that coun-
tries with higher shares of foreign assets in their net wealth tend to en-
joy better income smoothing through higher international factor income
flows. Therefore, the equity home bias and the lack of international con-
sumption risk sharing appear as ’twin puzzles separated at birth’.7 We
follow Sørensen et al. (2007) and empirically link the rise in consumption
risk sharing to the growth in industrialized countries’ international asset
7 Imbs and Fratzscher (2009)reach similar conclusions as Sørensen et al. (2007) but their
focus is not on the increase in risk sharing over time but rather on the impact on risk sharing
of the interaction between institutional quality and financial openness. They show that
financial openness can mitigate the negative impact of bad domestic institutions.
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positions. Importantly, our analysis differs from theirs in its focus on the
lower-frequency movements in the data. As we have argued above, this
focus is important in evaluating the long-term benefits from financial glob-
alization: we will only expect these benefits to be substantial if there is
an impact of financial globalization on the extent to which persistent id-
iosyncratic shocks are shared. Our results here also complement those of
Sørensen et al. (2007) and Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) in showing
that the increase in capital flows is ultimately the main channel of improve-
ments in risk sharing: as discussed above, from a theoretical point of view,
it should not be possible to insure against permanent idiosyncratic shocks
through intertemporal asset trade (i.e. by de-coupling consumption and
income) but only through international diversification trade (i.e. by de-
coupling income from output). One of our contributions in this paper is
to confirm that this theoretical conjecture is borne out by the data as finan-
cial globalization has progressed.8 In achieving this de-coupling of income
from output, international cross-holdings of state-contingent assets should
play a key role. Again, our findings confirm this intuition: interestingly, the
effects of international cross-holdings of equity on long-term risk sharing
and capital income flows appear stronger than for debt assets, suggesting
that in particular the decline in equity home bias was instrumental in low-
ering countries’ exposure to long-term idiosyncratic risk.
The studies by Becker and Hoffmann (2006) and Leibrecht and Scharler
(2008) are direct precursors to ours in their focus on the lower frequency of
the data – both papers use panel cointegration and vector auto-regressive
8 See Crucini (1999), Heathcote and Violante (2007) and Artis and Hoffmann (2008b) for
theoretical models with partial insurance that formalize this idea.
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techniques to study risk sharing between countries. Here, we go substan-
tially beyond these analyses by exploring how low-frequency risk sharing
has increased over time as globalization has progressed.
The idea that improved risk sharing shold be easier to detect in the
lower frequency was first laid out in a previous working paper version
of the present paper (Artis and Hoffmann (2006)) that also provides a sim-
ple theoretical model. In Artis and Hoffmann (2008a) we use this frame-
work to explore the shifting patterns of risk sharing within the European
Monetary Union. Different from this companion paper, our analysis here
focuses on the key finding that the increase in international risk sharing is
ultimately explained by a dramatic increase in the role of capital income
flows. In addition, the present paper uses the actual time variation in in-
ternational asset positions over the last several decades to study how the
financial globalization has affected international risk sharing and how this
lines up quantitatvely with the increase in risk sharing detected by our un-
conditional measure.
A recent, concurrent study in the same mold is Matsumoto, Flood and
Marion (2009) who also look at the long-term volatility of consumption
shares as a measure of risk sharing and reach similar conclusions concern-
ing the increase in long-run risk sharing. However, the methodology of
Matsumoto, Flood and Marion (2009) focuses on consumption volatility,
which does not allow them to identify whether declining volatility in con-
sumption shares is actually driven by changes in the underlying risks (e.g.
shocks to output shares becoming less volatile) or by changes in the risk
sharing ’technology’ (better integration of financial markets, i.e. financial
globalization). Their approach therefore also does not allow to consider the
role of various risk sharing channels nor do they explore the role that in-
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creased international asset holdings have played for the rise in long-term
risk sharing. We offer such an integrated perspective here.
2 Empirical Implementation
2.1 A risk sharing regression in levels
Our empirical analysis builds on a key prediction from economic theory:
standard models with complete financial markets such as the one first stud-
ied by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) imply that fluctuations in relative
(i.e. idiosyncratic) marginal utility growth should be independent of id-
iosyncratic risk. To the extent that marginal utility can be captured by con-
sumption, the coefficient of a regression of relative consumption growth
on indicators of idiosyncratic risk, such as relative output growth rates,
should be close to zero. This coefficient – typically between zero and one in
the data – has subsequently been interpreted as the fraction of idiosyncratic
risk that remains unshared, e.g. because financial markets are incomplete:
if the coefficient is unity, no risk is shared, if it is zero, all risk is shared. Gen-
erally, such risk sharing regressions have been estimated with data that has
been rendered stationary through first differencing. An important novelty
of our approach is to use the information implicit in the levels of relative
consumption and output. Specifically, we focus on regressions of the form
ckt − c∗t = βU
[
ykt − y∗t
]
+ constant + φk + εkt (1)
where c and y stand for the (natural logarithm) of consumption and out-
put in country k respectively, the asterisk denotes world-averages, φk is a
country fixed effect and εkt the residual.
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This equation is reminiscent of the equations estimated in Mace (1991),
Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996), Cochrane (1991a) or Crucini (1999)
and its interpretation is quite analogous. The decisive difference vis-a`-vis
the earlier literature is that equation (1) relates relative log-levels whereas
earlier implementations were formulated in differences. The levels-regression
can be thought of as a differenced regression with a very long differencing
horizon and as such emphasizes the low-frequency comovement between
relative consumption and output levels.9
We argue that this emphasis on the low frequencies is essential in iden-
tifying the effect of financial globalization on risk sharing. Simple specifica-
tions of the risk sharing regression with the data differenced at the annual
frequency do not consistently pick up an increase in risk sharing over time
(see e.g. the results in Artis and Hoffmann (2008b) and Imbs (2006), Bai
and Zhang (2005) and the discussion in Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2009)).
Heathcote and Perri (2004) even report that international consumption cor-
relations have decreased for the U.S. Conversely, our results below clearly
show an increase in risk sharing (a drop in the estimated coefficient) when
we use the levels regression (1) that emphasizes the low-frequency comove-
ment between relative output and consumption.
9This is easily derived from the first order-condition of the representative consumer
in country k: when financial markets are complete, δu′(Ckt+1)/u
′(Ckt ) = Λt+1/Λt where
u(.) is utility, δ the time preference rate and Λtthe shadow price associated with the ag-
gregate resource constraint. With constant relative risk aversion utility, this yields the
familiar condition that consumption growth in country k should depend only on aggre-
gate variables (i.e. those affecting Λt+1). Multiplying that condition over T periods,
we get
(
Ckt+T/Ct
)
=
(
Λt+T /Λt
δT
)−1/ρ
where ρ is relative risk aversion. At time t= 0,
Ck0 = ΦkC
∗
0 where C
∗
0 is aggregate consumption and Φkis country k’s (ex ante) consump-
tion share. Then recognizing that C∗t+T/C∗t =
(
Λt+T /Λt
δT
)−1/ρ
and taking logs we have
ckt+T − c∗t+T = φk, i.e. relative (log) consumption shares should be constant and, in par-
ticular, independent of relative output levels for T large enough.
9
2.2 Data
We examine annual data for 23 OECD countries ranging from 1960 to 2004.
Consumption, GDP and GNP (income) and population are from the Penn
World Table, release 6.2 (PWT 6.12.) by Heston, Summers and Aten (2006).
All data are in constant (2000) prices. The countries included in our estima-
tion are:
1. Canada, 2. the United States, 3. Japan, 4. Austria, 5. Belgium, 6.
Denmark , 7. Finland, 8. France, 9. Germany (West), 10. Greece, 11. Iceland,
12. Ireland, 13. Italy, 14. Luxembourg, 15. Netherlands, 16. Norway, 17.
Portugal, 18. Spain, 19. Sweden, 20. Switzerland, 21. United Kingdom, 22.
Australia, 23. New Zealand.
We also obtain results for U.S. state level data. While interesting in their
own right — level risk sharing regressions as we propose them here have
not previously been estimated on regional data — the regional results from
a financially highly integrated economy such as the U.S. will provide a nat-
ural benchmark against which we can evaluate our international results.
The US-data set is the one used in the seminal paper by Asdrubali, Sørensen
and Yosha (1996) where it is also described in detail. Output and income are
measured by gross-state product and state-level personal (disposable) in-
come data respectively, both from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
regional economic accounts. Consumption data at the state level are not
available. We follow Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) and virtually
the entire literature on regional risk sharing in the U.S. by using retail sales
data. State-level retail sales data are re-scaled by the share of retail sales
in aggregate (US-wide) consumption to obtain measures of state level con-
sumption. We follow the general practice in the US regional business cycle
literature and drop Washington D.C. from the sample. All data are deflated
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by the US-wide consumption price index and range from 1960 to 1990.
We express all data in per capita terms. Rest of the World (RoW) ag-
gregates are the US- or OECD-wide average per capita values. Population
data are from the BEA and PWT respectively.
Over the sample period covered by our international data set, inter-
national financial markets have become increasingly liberalized. To take
account of this change, we will report results obtained for two sub-periods:
the first covers the period 1960-1990, the second covers 1990-2004. The re-
sults we obtain from the first sub-period can be compared directly to oth-
ers in the literature (the studies by Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and Crucini
(1999) cover the same period), while the results from the second sub-period
should provide insights into the effects of the dramatic growth in gross in-
ternational asset positions since the beginning of the 1990s.
2.3 The increase in long-term risk sharing
We now turn to estimating the level risk sharing regression (1). This rela-
tionship can, in principle, be estimated consistently by OLS. However, we
have to acknowledge that relative consumption and output levels may be
non-stationary, including the possibility that they are cointegrated. In this
case, OLS may suffer from second-order bias due to potential simultaneity
and serial correlation of the errors. Phillips and Moon (1999) therefore ad-
vocate a panel version of the fully modified least squares (FMLS) method.
Since the FMLS estimator is semi-parametric, it may, however, be imper-
fectly suited to relatively small samples. The panel dynamic OLS (PDOLS)
estimator suggested by Mark and Sul (2003) may be preferable in this case.
We therefore conduct all our analyses here based on the panel OLS and the
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panel dynamic OLS estimator.
The panel dynamic OLS estimator accounts for serial correlation and
potential simultaneity by including leads and lags of the differences of the
right hand side variables. We experimented with various leads and lags
and found our results to be very robust across specifications. All results
were also very similar to those obtained from plain panel OLS estimates.
The PDOLS parameter estimates in Table 1 are based on one lead and lag
for each country which we found sufficient to capture serial dependence in
our annual data.10
Table 1 presents our first main results. To set the scene, Panel I presents
results from pooled regressions (i.e. without fixed effects), whereas Panel
II presents results from the fixed-effect level risk sharing regression. The
pooled or ’between’ regressions emphasizes the cross-sectional dimension
of the data even more, thus bringing out the long-run interaction between
the data. This serves as an interesting comparison.11 Our findings carry
a clear message: for US federal states, we find that around 50 percent of
long-run risk gets shared. Virtually the same coefficient is obtained once
we control for fixed effects. In international data, based on the pooled es-
timate, we detect that risk sharing is below 10 percent – the estimate of
βU exceeds 0.9 in the 1960-90 period. For the later (i.e. the globalization)
period, estimates of the coefficient are around 0.75. This is considerably
10We note that it is inconsequential for the estimation of the regression coefficient in (1)
whether relative consumption and output are indeed cointegrated or not. As Mark and Sul
(2003) note, the coefficient of a non-stationary panel regression is meaningful even if there
is no cointegration between the variables. The spurious-regression problem is alleviated
through the panel dimension. Still, it may facilitate theoretical interpretation of our results
below, if we can treat (1) as a panel cointegrating relation. Pedroni (2004) group mean test
for panel cointegration on the residuals of the country-wise PDOLS-regressions strongly
rejects the null of no cointegration in all samples and sub-periods. The test statistics are
reported as memorandum items at the bottom of Table 1.
11Of course, the pooled estimate is also potentially more susceptible to unobserved het-
erogeneity across countries. Therefore, our main tool in the sequel of the paper is the fixed-
effect panel regression.
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lower than in the 1960-90 period and the difference does appear to be sig-
nificant. Turning to the fixed-effect estimates, the increase in international
risk sharing in the post-1990 period appears even more marked: for the
1960-90 period we now find virtually no risk sharing (βU = 0.98), whereas
for the globalization period the corresponding value is around βU = 0.65.
Note that the choice of estimation method (OLS vs. PDOLS) has practically
no effect on the results.12
Our results suggest that there is a lack of (long-run) risk sharing in in-
ternational data in both sub-periods, but even at the regional level we find
that U.S. citizens own a disproportionate share of the claims to output of the
federal state in which they live – around 50 percent of the shocks to regional
output levels affect consumption in the own federal state. This result is im-
portant because it provides perspective on the impact that globalization has
had on the ’lack of international risk sharing’: 13 our results in Table 1 of the
increase in long-term international risk sharing during the 1990s suggests a
drop in the value of βU from 0.91 to 0.74 for the pooled estimate. If our em-
pirical measure of long-term risk sharing among U.S. states (∼ 0.5) is taken
as a benchmark, then around 40 percent ((0.91− 0.75) / (0.91− 0.47) =
0.17/0.43 ≈ 0.4) of the lack of international risk sharing (gaged not rela-
12This result is informative about the empirical relevance of theoretical scenarios in which
consumption and output are incidentally correlated for reasons that are unrelated to finan-
cial market incompleteness, for example, due to preferences that are non-separable in con-
sumption and leisure as in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992). The fact that we do not find
major differences between the PDOLS - which implicitly controls for this incidental correla-
tion – and the panel OLS estimates supports the notion that such non-separabilities are not
likely to have an important effect on risk sharing regressions. This is in line with Backus,
Kehoe and Kydland’s own conclusion that the non-separability between consumption and
leisure cannot quantitatively resolve the consumption correlation puzzle.
13Note that risk sharing among U.S. federal states will also partly be achieved through net
fiscal transfers. Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) show that this channel accounts for
roundabout 10-15% of the risk sharing achieved among U.S. federal states at business cy-
cle frequencies. Becker and Hoffmann (2006) report similar results for the long-run. Given
these findings, the increase in risk sharing through private capital markets at the interna-
tional level – where fiscal transfers are virtually absent – would appear relatively even more
important.
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tive to some theoretical model but to the real-world counterpart of a well-
integrated national economy, the United States) has vanished in the years
after 1990. Based on the fixed effect estimate, the increase in risk sharing
would appear even more dramatic; all this suggests that the increase in risk
sharing in international data is not only statistically significant but also eco-
nomically important.
In Table 2 we provide a number of checks that illustrate that the in-
crease in international risk sharing is indeed a robust feature of the data.
First, we run our regressions on the 1975-1990 sub-period which is practi-
cally of equal length as the globalization period 1990-2004.14 Secondly, to
rule out that our findings are unduly affected by small but financially very
open economies such as Switzerland, Ireland, Luxembourg and Iceland, we
experiment with excluding these countries from the sample. For compari-
son, we also run the regressions for a sample of 11 small open economies
only. Third, we further address the issue that relative consumption and
output levels may be non-stationary variables. As we have argued before,
spurious regression problems are not much of an issue in non-stationary
panels (see Phillips and Moon (1999)). In addition, our results in Table 1
suggest that the risk sharing regression identifies a panel cointegrating re-
lationship. Nonetheless we provide additional evidence for the robustness
of our general conclusions by differencing the data at horizons of three and
14As we argued above, the regression picks up the low-frequency movement between
relative consumption and output. Running the regression on a shorter sample could make it
more difficult to identify the relevant low-frequency comovement. However, as the results
show, there is no major difference between the results for the long (1960-1990) and the short
(1975-1990) pre-globalization period. This suggests that with a maximum cycle length of 15
years (and capturing unobserved heterogeneity with fixed effects), we are able to capture
most of the low-frequency comovement that is relevant for our analysis here. Given that
the pre-1990- and the post-1990 sample now have equal length, we can now also be sure
that any differences between the sub-periods cannot be due to a failure of the method to
detect the relevant low-frequency components in one of the two periods.
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five years.15 As is apparent from the table, the gist of our results remains
unaffected by all of these exercises: the more we emphasize the lower fre-
quency of the data, the more clearly we see a decline in the estimated coef-
ficients over time – there is a clear increase in international risk sharing.16
We further illustrate the importance of focusing on the low frequency
of the data by running our level risk sharing regression as a sequence of
cross-sectional regressions :
ckt − c∗t = βU(t)
[
ykt − y∗t
]
+ τt + ε
k
t (2)
The sequence {βU(t)} then gives us a detailed time profile of the in-
crease in risk sharing. Figure (1) plots the sequence {βU(t)} obtained in
this way against the sequence of coefficients {β∆U(t)} from the differenced
risk sharing regression, again run as a sequence of cross-sectional regres-
sions:17
∆ckt − ∆c∗t = β∆U(t)
[
∆ykt − ∆y∗t
]
+ τt + ε
k
t (3)
It is clearly apparent from Figure (1) that the coefficient of the level risk
15Of course, using data that has been differenced at longer horizons to emphasize the
low-frequency interaction will lead to a loss of a substantial number of observations in the
annual samples we are considering here, making the method possibly less efficient than our
level regressions.
16Our focus in this paper is on risk sharing between industrialized economies. However,
we also applied our level risk sharing regressions to a sample of 22 emerging economies.
Here, the coefficients stay very close to one, irrespective of the sample period. Hence, our
level risk sharing corroborates the findings in Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2009) that de-
veloping countries are not reaping the benefits from financial globalization. However, we
emphasize again that much of the earlier literature has found it difficult to document a
consistent increase in risk sharing even among industrialized economies. Along this di-
mension, our results here differ clearly.
17Sequences of cross-sectional regressions of this type have been used by e.g. Sørensen
et al. (2007) and Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (forthcoming) to illustrate the dy-
namics of risk sharing in various contexts. The cross-sectional regressions can be thought
of as a snapshot of the ’between’ or ’steady-state’ interaction of the variables. The levels
regression emphasizes this ’between’-interaction at the lower frequency , the differenced
regression at a higher frequency. See also Cochrane (1991b) for the use of cross-sectional
regressions to measure risk sharing.
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sharing shows a pronounced downward trend. However, it is much harder
to discern such a trend from the coefficients of the differenced regressions:
first, there is a lot of cyclical variation how much consumption risk gets
shared at the business cycle frequency. Secondly, even if we use a filter
(here: an HP filter with smoothness parameter 6.25) to smooth the esti-
mates of β∆U(t), it is not clear that the estimates clearly trend downwards.
This further illustrates our point: in identifying the effects of globalization
on risk sharing, one should turn to the lower frequencies of the data.18
3 Patterns of risk sharing and international asset po-
sitions
In this section, we demonstrate that the main channel through which the in-
crease in international consumption risk sharing has occurred is through an
increase in international capital income flows and that both developments
– better risk sharing and bigger role for international capital income flows
– can directly be traced to this growth in gross international investment po-
sitions that has been documented in the literature (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007)).
18Note that for the analysis in Figure 1, we extend the data set to 2007 using the Penn
World Table release 6.3 so that the estimation period becomes 1975-2007. Our earlier analy-
sis as well as in the remainder of the the paper is based on the PWT 6.2 which ends in 2004.
There are some issues of comparability across the two data sets and for the time being we
prefer to work with PWT 6.2 as our main data set. 2004 is also a natural choice because we
link the increase in risk sharing to the increase in international asset positions in the next
section and the data set of choice is Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s External Wealth of Nations
data set mark II which ends in 2004. Still, it is reassuring to see that our results extend
beyond 2004.
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3.1 Channels of risk sharing
One reason why we focus our analysis on the lower frequencies of the data
is that we expect to identify the effect of globalization on the various risk
sharing channels more sharply. From the point of view of a large class of
theoretical models, it should not be possible to insure against permanent
idiosyncratic shocks through intertemporal asset trade (i.e. by de-coupling
consumption and income) but only through international diversification
trade (i.e. by de-coupling income (GNP) from output (GDP)). Following
this logic, we focus on two channels of risk sharing. We associate the first
with the (logarithmic) ratio between a country’s or region’s output and in-
come and refer to it as the capital-income-flows, income-smoothing or ex
ante channel. We capture the role of the other channel through variation
in the (relative) consumption income ratio. We can think of this second
channel as intertemporal consumption smoothing through saving and dis-
saving. We also refer to it as the ex post channel.19 Our conjecture is that
changes in the long-run risk sharing parameter βU are associated mainly
with the first channel, i.e. with capital income flows. Conversely, consump-
tion smoothing should play a much more limited role in the long run. To
test this prediction, we follow Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) and
decompose our estimate of βU above. Specifically, to measure the role of
the capital income channel, we run the regression
[
ykt − y∗t
]
−
[
inckt − inc∗t
]
= βK
[
ykt − y∗t
]
+ θkK + ν
k
t (4)
19We think of international or interregional capital income flows as being derived from
ex ante diversification of countries’ or regions’ portfolios, whereas consumption smooth-
ing happens ex post, i.e. after income is observed is observed for the current period. This
explains the choice of label.
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where ‘inc‘ denotes the logarithm of income and θkK is a country or state-
level fixed effect. The contribution of the consumption-smoothing channel
to risk sharing is measured through regressions of the form
[
inckt − inc∗t
]
−
[
ckt − c∗t
]
= βC
[
ykt − y∗t
]
+ θkC + ξ
k
t (5)
Note that we have
βC + βK = 1− βU
by construction, i.e. the sum of the two channels must always be equal
to one minus the coefficient from our levels risk sharing regression above.
However, we emphasize that the empirically interesting questions we face
is whether the prediction from theory – that risk sharing in the long-run is
mainly coming from capital income flows – is confirmed in the data. This
would require that that the increase in 1− βU is driven mainly by an in-
crease in βK.
We estimate equations (4) and (5) using panel dynamic OLS with one
lead and lag, controlling for fixed effects and for common time-specific
variation. For the U.S., the real world income data we use for this exer-
cise is state-level personal disposable income. In international data, we
measure income through gross national product (GNP). The Penn World
Tables contain GNP only after 1970. We therefore limit our analysis of in-
ternational data from now on to the post-1970 period. This does not affect
the interpretation of our results since our estimates of βU for the 1970-90
period are virtually identical to those obtained for the 1960-90 period.
Table 3, Panel A, reports our results. For the US we find that most risk
sharing is done through capital income flows whereas the ex post channel is
virtually absent. This lines up with the theoretical prediction that risk shar-
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ing in the long-run should be associated with capital income flows and not
with ex post smoothing. In international data, the impact of globalization is
also clearly visible: risk sharing is very low in the 19970-1990 period, both
the ex ante and the ex post channel are almost mute. The picture changes
completely once we turn to the globalization (1990-2004) period: now there
is a considerable amount of risk sharing in international data and most of
this falls on capital income flows: roundabout one quarter of idiosyncratic
output risk gets shared ex ante. There is also a moderate increase in ex post
consumption smoothing. But this effect is much more subdued and the ex
post channel appears only marginally significant.
These results confirm our conjecture that international risk sharing should
be driven by capital income flows in the long-run. They provide a comple-
mentary perspective to an important literature that has shown that interna-
tional risk sharing is lower than in U.S. data mainly because international
capital income flows do not contribute to risk sharing (Sørensen and Yosha
(1998), Becker and Hoffmann (2006)). Lane (2001) concludes that interna-
tional investment income flows have practically no bearing on risk sharing
internationally. These analyses have typically focused on business cycle
frequencies of the data by looking at versions of the regressions (4) and (5)
that are formulated in first differences. In Panel II of Table 3 we estimate
such differenced regressions for comparison.
The differenced regressions clearly corroborate the findings in the stud-
ies referenced above: The lack of international consumption risk sharing is
mainly a lack of ex ante income smoothing: for the 1960-90 period we find
roundabout 40 percent income smoothing for the U.S. and virtually none
in international data. We find a small rise in international consumption
risk sharing in the 1990-2004 period, with the sum of the coefficients of the
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differenced channel regressions, β∆K + β
∆
C, increasing from 0.27 to 0.33. But
this difference seems tiny and appears insignificant. Furthermore, even in
the globalization period, only a small share of an increase would be ex-
plained by capital income flows; β∆K increases from 0.03 to 0.06 and, again,
the increase is insignificant.The fact that the increase in risk sharing is much
less pronounced in the differenced regression is consistent with the results
and the theoretical channels highlighted in our previous work (Artis and
Hoffmann (2008b)): changes in the international correlation of business cy-
cles can partially offset the impact of globalization on the regression coef-
ficient of consumption growth and output growth (which corresponds to
1− β∆K − β∆C). Another interesting feature of the results is that that the rela-
tive ranking of the two channels changes in international data between the
short-run and the long-run. This finding is consistent with our earlier con-
jecture that the assignment of improvements in risk sharing to individual
channels may be much less clear-cut across in the short-run and the long-
run. While in the short-run improvements in risk sharing can in principle
come about both through capital income flows derived from ex ante portfo-
lio decisions or from ex post sales and purchases of assets, in the long-run
risk sharing will have to take place through income flows alone.
Summming up, the results from this subsection show that at short hori-
zons the increase in international risk sharing a) appears rather limited and
is, b), difficult to associate with a marked shift in risk sharing patterns to-
wards higher international income flows. At longer horizons, however,
this increase is much more readily apparent and the patterns of interna-
tional capital income flows line up with the predictions from a wide class
of simple theoretical models.
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3.2 The increase in international risk sharing and the growth in
gross international asset positions
In this subsection, we show that the increase in long-run risk sharing is
closely linked to the internationalization of asset ownership. As our mea-
sure of international portfolio diversification we use gross asset positions,
the sum of assets and liabilities, relative to GDP. This choice is based on
some a priori theoretical and empirical considerations. First, Obstfeld (2004)
distinguishes between two motives for asset trade: intertemporal or de-
velopment asset trade, which is reflected in net investment positions and
diversification asset trade, which he associates with gross asset positions.
Our interest in this paper is clearly in the risk sharing or diversification as-
pect of asset trade. Secondly, the focus on gross asset positions can also
be justified at an empirical level: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) note that
there has been a virtual explosion in cross-holdings of assets whereas net
positions have remained quite stable.
We modify our pooled level risk sharing regression to take account of
the internationalization of average gross asset positions. Specifically, we
parametrize βU as
βGFAU (t) = κ0 + κ1GFAt (6)
where GFAt is the average (across countries) gross foreign asset position
relative to GDP:
GFAt =
1
K
K
∑
k=1
GFAkt and GFA
k
t =
Akt + L
k
t
Ykt
Here, K denotes the number of countries, Akt is assets and L
k
t liabilities and
the bar denotes the cross-sectional mean. Our data source is the March 2006
release of the external wealth of nations data set by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
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(2007). To obtain estimates of κ0 and κ1, we plug (6) into our panel level risk
sharing regression and estimate the ensuing regression with interaction
terms by panel dynamic OLS. Based on these estimates, we can then obtain
βGFAU (t) from (6).
We obtain these two time-varying measures of βU for the period from
1975 to 2004. Using panel dynamic OLS, we estimate
βGFAU (t) = 1.01− 0.1GFAt
with t-statistics on κ0 and κ1 of 19.97 and −2.94 respectively. There is a
statistically significant link between average gross foreign asset positions
and risk sharing. Our estimate of κ0 is virtually unity, suggesting that cross-
holdings of assets seem to account for all the consumption risk sharing
we see in the data. Finally, it is interesting to appreciate the magnitude of
the coefficient κ1: increasing average gross foreign asset holdings by 100
percent of GDP will increase consumption risk sharing by roundabout 10
percentage points.20
In Figure (2) we plot both the estimated coefficients βU(t) from the se-
quence of cross-sectional regressions in (3) (here based on PWT 6.2 and
ending in 2004) as well as the measure based on the parametrization (6),
βGFAU (t). Though obtained from different approaches, the two measures
both clearly indicate an increase in risk sharing that is of a very similar
magnitude. We also obtain standard errors for βU(t) from a jackknife pro-
20We emphasize that, very much as in Sorensen et al. (2007) or Imbs and Fratzscher
(2009), we do not wish to interpret these coefficients in a causal manner. Plausibly both the
explosion in asset holdings and improved risk sharing have their common origin in finan-
cial liberalizations around the world. This is what Sorensen et al. (2007) have called “twin
puzzles”: the lack of international consumption risk sharing and the home bias puzzle go
in hand. What we aim to establish here is that this link is also clearly apparent once we
focus on consumption risk sharing in the lower frequency. As discussed before, establish-
ing this link also for low-frequency measures of consumption risk sharing is important in
evaluating the welfare benefits from financial globalization.
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cedure (Efron (1982)), in which we re-estimate the sequence βU(t) (for t =
1975...2004) 23 times, dropping one country from the sample at a time. The
tightness of the two standard error bands thus obtained also demonstrates
that our conclusions concerning the extent of long-term risk sharing and
its increase during the recent globalization period are robust with respect
to the inclusion or exclusion of individual countries in our sample. In ad-
dition, over most of the sample period, the GFA-based measure is gener-
ally well within the bands, suggesting that it is almost statistically indis-
tinguishable from βU(t).21 We find this particularly remarkable since we
have not been using any information about asset holdings in estimating the
sequence of cross-sectional regressions (3). These findings are suggestive:
the decline in our home bias measure and the associated rise in risk shar-
ing seem indeed intimately linked. However, the two variables GFA and
βU(t) are trending and unless we make use of the cross-sectional variation
in international asset positions, it will be hard to distinguish the impact of
financial globalization from some other trend, unrelated to the growth in
GFA, that might be driving our results. We therefore now turn to exploit-
ing information concerning the cross-country variation in asset holding.
A salient feature of the results in Table 2 that distinguishes our findings
from most of the earlier literature is that the increase in international risk
sharing is strongly associated with a more important role for international
income flows. We show that this changing pattern is also directly related
to the growth in GFA. To this end, we parametrize the pattern of risk shar-
21Only towards the end of the sample period, the two measures diverge somewhat, as the
decline in βU(t) seems to flatten out for a couple of years. A potential explanation is that the
global stock market decline after 2000 has lowered the value of equity and other financial
assets relative to real assets, notably human wealth and housing. Since holdings of these as-
sets are not internationally diversified, international risk sharing may well have decreased
temporarily only to pick up again in 2003 with the recovery of international stock markets.
Since βGFAU (t) is a function of gross foreign asset positions only – which have continued to
grow relative to GDP – it does not detect this temporary decrease in risk sharing.
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ing so that βK and βC,vary across time and countries by using the time t -
country k realization of GFA instead of its cross-sectional, mean:
βkX(t) = β0X + β1XGFA
k
t + β2Xt.
Here X stands for K and C in turn. Plugging this specification into our
channel regressions, we again obtain a set of regressions with interaction
terms between relative output and GFA and t respectively. Again, we also
consider a specification without a linear trend.
The impact of certain asset categories on the patterns of risk sharing
may not necessarily be uniform. In particular, we would expect that equity
assets and liabilities to have a more direct impact on state-contingent in-
ternational capital income flows than debt instruments. We therefore also
express the pattern of risk sharing as a function of the growth in interna-
tional gross equity positions and of debt holdings, parametrizing
βkX(t) = β0X + β1XGFE
k
t + β2Xt
βkX(t) = β0X + β1XGFD
k
t + β2Xt
where GFEkt (GFD
k
t ) is the sum of equity (debt) assets and liabilities divided
by GDP.
Table 4 reports the results for these interaction term regressions. The
analysis here is limited to the 1990-2004 period, for which we have unin-
terrupted data by asset category for all 23 countries. The first two columns
are for total assets, rows 3 and 4 for equity and columns 5 and 6 for debt
assets.
The picture emerging from the Table is clearly that the growth in inter-
national cross-holdings tends to increase risk sharing – the sum βK1 + βC1
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is positive and significant for all three categories of assets. Most interest-
ingly however, the growth in GFA, GFE and GFD has a particularly strong
effect on βK, i.e. the contribution of capital income flows to risk sharing.
In line with prior expectations, this effect is particularly strong for cross-
holdings of equity assets: equity is more likely to deliver state-contingent
dividend payments whereas debt assets will not generally provide such in-
come insurance. Conversely, debt assets have a relatively stronger impact
on risk sharing through ex post accumulation or decumulation of foreign
assets (βC).
4 Summary and Conclusion
The literature so far has found it relatively difficult to document that fi-
nancial globalization finds its reflection in better international consump-
tion risk sharing: only studies that have explicitly conditioned on inter-
national asset holdings have found consumption risk sharing to have in-
creased. But while this implies that higher international asset holdings are
indeed associated with better risk sharing, this does not necessarily imply
that consumption risk sharing has increased unconditionally. For example,
financial globalization may allow countries to trade in assets more easily.
But it may also induce substantial shifts in the patterns of the underlying
risks. For example, by altering industrial structures and the patterns of
specialization (see Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2003)), financial
globalization may make business cycles less symmetric, also leading to a
requirement to share more risk.
In this paper, we have argued that one way to get to grips with this
issue is to focus on the lower frequency of the data: first, the lower fre-
25
quency is important from a welfare perspective. Since the seminal work
of Lucas (1987) it is known that the welfare effects of the elimination of
consumption risk are likely to be small unless idiosyncratic shocks are per-
sistent. At the same time, the lower frequency (i.e. trend) movements of
output and consumption are less likely to be affected by changes in the in-
ternational correlation of business cycles. This, secondly, implies that on
theoretical grounds, improvements in risk sharing should show up first
and empirically most robustly in the lower frequencies of the data. In our
analysis, we have emphasized these lower frequencies by making use of
the information implicit in the relative levels of output and consumption.
Unlike many earlier econometric specifications that have focused on the
business cycle link between consumption and output, this has allowed us
to document that risk sharing has indeed increased considerably among
industrialized economies – without a need to explicitly condition on the
growth in international asset positions . By the end of our sample period,
more than 30 percent of the long-term idiosyncratic risk faced by the aver-
age OECD country gets shared internationally. The main channel through
which these improvements in international risk sharing seem to have come
about is through a larger contribution of international capital income flows
to the smoothing of national income rather than through direct smoothing
of consumption through saving and dis-saving.
In our analysis, we acknowledge that both – higher cross-holdings of
assets and higher risk sharing – are likely to be different sides of the same
medal. Both are likely to be endogenous reactions to what are common
driving forces, such as financial liberalizations, institutional reforms and
technological advances. While we do not solve this endogeneity problem,
we argue that a large part of the observed increase in long-run risk sharing
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can indeed be linked to the growth in international asset positions. We
find that higher gross asset positions lead to considerably more long-run
insurance and that capital income flows play a more pronounced role as a
channel of risk sharing for those countries that have large cross-holdings of
asset, notably of equities.
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Table 1: The increase in long-run risk sharing
Panel I: Pooled Regressions (w/o fixed effects)
(ckt − c∗t ) = const + τt + βU(ykt − y∗t ) + ukt
United States OECD
1960-90 1960-90 1990-2004
OLS 0.48 (0.01) 0.93 (0.01) 0.75 (0.03)
Panel Dynamic OLS 0.47 (0.02) 0.91 (0.02) 0.74 (0.06)
Panel II: Fixed effect regressions
(ckt − c∗t ) = const + τt + φk + βU(ykt − y∗t ) + ukt
United States OECD
(1960-90) 1960-90 1990-2004
OLS 0.50 (0.02) 0.98 (0.02) 0.63 (0.02)
Panel Dynamic OLS 0.52 (0.04) 0.99 (0.04) 0.66 (0.03)
Panel Cointegration tests
-2.36 -2.42 -2.17
NOTES: The results reported for the panel dynamic OLS estimation are based on estimating equa-
tions of the form ckt− c∗kt = b̂xkt +∑pl=−p δkl∆xt−l + vkt where xkt = (ykt− y∗kt) and
vkt = τt + u
k
t or v
k
t = τt + φk + u
k
t , depending on whether it is a pooled or fixed regression.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. Those for the PDOLS estimates are based on Mark and Sul
(2003).All regressions control for time fixed effects. The panel cointegration tests at the bottom of the
table are Pedroni’s (2004) group mean t-statistics and are based on the PDOLS fixed-effect regressions.
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Table 2: The increase in long-run risk sharing – robustness checks
Panel I: Different country groups and sample periods
Panel dynamic OLS estimates of (ckt − c∗t ) = const + τt + βU(ykt − y∗t ) + ukt
Country group 1960-90 1975-90 1990-2004
pooled FE pooled FE pooled FE
All 0.91 0.98 0.93 0.86 0.74 0.65
(39.38) (27.27) (25.91) (10.96) (12.29) (22.35)
All w/o most open SOEs 0.92 1.03 0.90 0.86 0.74 0.86
(29.46) (26.82) (16.39) (10.41) (8.796) (16.12)
SOEs only 0.89 1.04 0.90 1.06 0.73 0.65
(22.54) (11.62) (17.26) (10.00) (12.32) (29.47)
Panel II:long-horizon differenced regressions
OLS estimates of (ckt+l − c∗t+l)− (ckt − c∗t ) = const + τt + φk + βU
[
(ykt+l − y∗t+l)− (ykt − y∗t )
]
+ ukt
Country group 1960-90 1975-90 1990-2004
3 yrs 5yrs 3 yrs 5yrs 3yrs 5yrs
All 0.83 0.84 0.90 0.78 0.78 0.79
(14.65) (11.27) (10.73) (7.93) (10.74) (10.61)
All but SOEs 0.88 0.95 0.92 0.88 0.79 0.78
(14.30) (11.56) (12.74) (12.92) (17.22) (10.09)
SOEs only 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.73 0.76 0.80
(8.60) (5.44) (7.70) (4.74) (7.76) (7.66)
Notes: Table provides estimates of the risk sharing coefficients (βU) based on different sample pe-
riods, estimation methods and country groups. FE denotes the fixed effect estimate. ‘All’ refers
to all 23 OECD countries, ‘All but SOEs ’ excludes the most open small economies Luxemburg,
Ireland, Iceland and Switzerland. ‘SOEs only’ comprises 11 small open economies: Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland. t-stats
in parentheses.
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Table 3: Risk sharing patterns and the rising importance of capital income
flows
United States OECD
1960-90 1970-90 1990-2004
ex ante ex post ex ante ex post ex ante ex post
Panel I: Levels Regressions
βK βC βK βC βK βC
0.45 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.26 0.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Panel II: Differenced Regressions
β∆K β
∆
C β
∆
K β
∆
C β
∆
K β
∆
C
0.39 0.46 0.03 0.24 0.06 0.27
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
NOTES: regression coefficients from equations (4) (ex ante) and (5) (ex post). Panel
I reports these regressions in level, panel II their first order differenced version. All
regressions control for time-specific and region- or country specific fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4: Risk sharing patterns as function of international asset positions
Interaction of total assets (GFA) equity assets (GFE) debt assets (GFD)[
ykt − y∗t
]
with
ex ante ex post ex ante ex post ex ante ex post
βkK(t) β
k
C(t) β
k
K(t) β
k
C(t) β
k
K(t) β
k
C(t)
1 (β0) 0.16 0.47 0.33 0.41 0.08 0.22
(4.80) (8.30) ( 16.28) (8.94) (1.95) (3.31)
GFAkt (βX1) 0.08 -0.03
(12.69) (-3.05)
GFEkt (βX1) 0.21 -0.16
(26.73) (-12.47)
GFDkt (βX1) 0.09 0.05
(10.40) (3.76)
trend (βX2) -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.0002
(-4.32) ( 0.25) (-11.49) (3.84) (-11.07) (0.08)
NOTES: The Table reports results for PDOLS regressions of the form[
ykt − y∗t
]
−
[
inckt − inc∗t
]
= θKk + β
k
Kt
[
ykt − y∗t
]
+ vKt and
[
inckt − inc∗t
]
−
[
ckt − c∗t
]
= θCk +
βC
[
ykt − y∗t
]
+ vCt where β
k
Xt = β0X + β1XGFx
k
t + β2Xt for X = K, C and where GFx stands
for GFA, GFE, GFD in turn. t-statistics in parentheses.
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Figure 1: The increase in consumption risk sharing 1975-2007 – levels vs. differ-
enced regressions
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Notes: The blue (solid /dots) line is the sequence of cross-sectional estimates of
the levels-risk sharing regression βU(t). The black dashed line is the sequence of
coefficients obtained from the differenced risk sharing regression, β∆U . The red
(squared) line is the sequence {β∆U} filtered using an HP-filter with smoothness
parameter λ = 6.25.
Figure 2: The increase in consumption risk sharing and international asset
positions 1975-2004
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Notes: The blue (solid /dots) line is the sequence of cross-sectional estimates of
βU(t). The red (dashed/ squares) line is βGFAU (t) = 1.01− 0.1GFAt where GFAt is
the cross-country mean gross foreign asset position. The thin (black) solid lines
are the plus/minus two standard deviation bands for βU(t). These standard
deviations are obtained using a jackknife resampling procedure.
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